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BRAINERD CURRIE

critical approach he displayed and taught so well. At a time when
there were few women students in law school, and virtually no
female professors to serve as role models for them, Brainerd Currie
helped me gain the confidence to believe that I had something to
contribute to the legal profession. Only the verdict of more time
than has elapsed will determine whether he was right, but enough
years have passed for me to know that I am grateful.

BRAINERD CURRIE
SCHOLAR

'His conversationalpatience, his personal
kindliness, and his unlabored use of very great
learning could not help but stick'
By William Van Alstyne*
When a scholar dies and memorial editions subsequently mark the loss,
the most usual convention is to honor him in a festschrift of articles that
measure his influence-tracing the impact of his work and his thinking,
in measurable ways, upon the remaking of an entire discipline. In Brainerd
Currie's case, that ought not be neglected, because surely his seminal
contributions to choice-of-law theory have had a major impact. From an
original trilogy of articles written in 1957 (which with later essays were to
identify him as the first recipient of the Coif award), through a powerful
symbiosis with the highest courts in California and New York, Brainerd
regenerated a whole new intellectual life in the then-moribund subject of
conflicts of laws. Much that has happened since then has been like footnotes to his own footprints.
Nevertheless, an erudite remembrance of Brainerd Currie would leave
out certain things that are not easily measured. As a means of appreciation, it would suffer in the same way that the study of law itself has been
said to suffer-that it sharpens the mind by narrowing it. Most especially
for that reason-to fill in the personal contributions he made-I am grateful for the invitation to write briefly about Brainerd; it is frankly in the
interstices of what is already well known about him as a distinguished
* William R. Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University Law School. University of Southern California (B.A., magna cum laude, 1955); Stanford University (J.D., Coif, 1958); Hague
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scholar that he most touched my own life, as I know, too, he did so many
others. His example may also say something more generally that others
who teach fully believe but are too embarrassed to say in their own behalf
and in behalf of their profession.
As a student articles and book review editor at the Stanford Law Review
in 1957, I met Brainerd for the first time during his year at the Center for
Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences (which was even then
already known informally as "The Leisure of the Theory Class"). During
the days that he worried through parts of an article manuscript, without
knowing it, he made a lasting personal difference. Something in his conversational patience, his personal kindliness and his unlabored use of very
great learning could not help but stick: impressions of what a thoughtful
person was like in academic life, and of how, by personal qualities as much
as by measured scholarship, such people are helpful to others. Eventually
(and largely, as it turned out, as a consequence of his doing), I turned up
as his junior colleague at Duke. The two brief years with him here were
never disillusioning of those first impressions. "On duty" or off, he was at
ease with music, with literature, with things non-legal, with subjects constitutional and historical. Brainerd Currie was a person even Thorstein
Veblen would have liked; Veblen would have acknowledged Currie as an
exception to Veblen's general view that professional schools (law schools
and business schools most of all) were but academic money-changers who,
under Gresham's law, must inexorably drive out a more authentic higher
learning.
Were Brainerd Currie's career measured only by the traceable professional influence of his ideas, it would be impressive enough. But when all
that might be done, we would nonetheless have measured away the person
and chloroformed a number of qualities that continue to make him memorable these ten years after his death. As this issue of the Mercer Law
Review is dedicated to his memory, I think it should be said, without the
usual shuffling embarrassment, that Brainerd's personal qualities still animate a great deal others in higher education also cherish, qualities that
abide.

